Could someone send email as you?

Three DNS records decide whether a stranger can put your company’s name on a fake invoice. Here’s where yours stand.

Public DNS records only. Nothing is sent, nothing is stored, and the only thing that leaves your browser is the lookup itself.

Know your DKIM selector? Add it

Selectors are chosen by whoever sends your mail and can’t be listed from outside. We probe the common ones automatically — Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Mailchimp and friends. If yours is custom, put it here.

This check runs entirely in your browser, so it needs JavaScript switched on. Everything it looks at is explained below — or send your domain to [email protected] and we’ll run it and send the results back.

The four records

What the check actually reads

None of this is secret. Every mail server on the internet reads the same records before it decides whether to trust a message claiming to be from you.

SPF

Who is allowed to send as you

A public list of the servers permitted to send mail using your domain. Miss one and your real invoices land in spam; leave it wide open and anybody’s server qualifies.

When it’s wrong Two SPF records instead of one is a silent failure — receivers treat it as broken and ignore both. So is quietly blowing past the ten-lookup limit as you add tools.

DKIM

The signature on the envelope

A cryptographic signature your mail server adds to every message, which receivers verify against a public key in your DNS. It proves the message wasn’t altered and really came from your system.

When it’s wrong It’s usually not wrong so much as never switched on — or switched on for the main mailbox and forgotten for the marketing tool that sends your newsletters.

DMARC

What to do with the fakes

The instruction that ties the other two together: if a message fails both, here’s what I want you to do with it, and here’s where to send me a report about it.

When it’s wrong The common state is p=none — published years ago, never enforced. It watches the forgeries go past. It doesn’t stop them.

MX

Where your mail actually lives

The servers that receive mail for your domain. We read these to work out who hosts your email, then check that your SPF record actually authorises them.

When it’s wrong A domain that moved to Microsoft 365 two years ago and still lists the old host is a real thing we find, roughly monthly.

This is exactly what we fix

Findings are easy. Not breaking your mail is the job.

Every record above can be corrected in an afternoon — and every one of them can also take your email offline if you change it in the wrong order. We do this the enterprise way: inventory every system that sends as you, publish DMARC in monitoring mode, read the reports for a couple of weeks, fix what shows up, then enforce.

Questions people ask

Is this safe to run on my domain?

Yes. It reads public DNS records — the same ones any mail server on the internet reads before accepting a message from you. It sends no email, touches no mailbox, and needs no access to anything you own.

What’s a DKIM selector, and why can’t you just find it?

A selector is a label your mail provider picks for each signing key, published at selector._domainkey.yourdomain.com. DNS has no way to list what exists under a name — you can only ask about a name you already know. So every DKIM checker on the internet, including this one, guesses the common selectors. If none of the guesses hit, that means unconfirmed, not missing. We say so.

Will turning on DMARC break my email?

It can, if you jump straight to an enforcing policy before you know every system that sends as you. The forgotten ones are always the same: the invoicing tool, the booking system, the scan-to-email on the copier. Monitor first, fix what the reports show, then enforce.

What do I do with the results?

Each finding names the record that has to change, so your DNS host or IT provider can act on it directly. If you’d rather not touch DNS yourself — a fair position, it’s the one place a typo takes the whole company’s email down — book a call and we’ll handle it.